

Ends of the Rainbow: South African Arts Funding in the Post-Mbeki Years

Thank for the opportunity to address you. Perhaps I had better warn you that I am speaking from a position of paradox: I am caught, in a sense, between representing the views of government, as the head of the Research Committee of South Africa's National Arts Council; and of course I am also an academic, with my own views on the history of arts funding. My theme tonight is the shifting nature of the arts funding terrain in South Africa, with respect not only to epochal changes in South African politics, but also in relation to arts in Africa generally.

An Historical Reminder

The second phase of post-apartheid government has come to an end. Like it or not, most commentators would agree that the Mbeki presidency is stalled and uncertain, and that many key divisions of government are drifting rudderless, or without helmsmen. A high percentage of key administrative posts are unfilled, and there is a sense in the air of cabinet itself waiting out the time of interregnum. When national crises arise, such as the catastrophic recent spate of attacks on foreigners, leaders seem paralysed, or are found to be missing in action, are incapable of diagnosing the situation, or bluster about some unnamed Third Force of instigators.

We are in a sorry state, it is clear, and, in close association with this crisis, the arts funding landscape is one of the sorriest of all. How on earth did this come to pass?

Many of you here today will know that in the 70s, 80s, and 90s, South Africa had one of the most politicized arts cultures in the world. When Jane Taylor and I produced the volume *From South Africa*, during the State of Emergency of the late 1980s, much of the fiction, poetry, photography, and art we encountered reflected a radically teleological understanding of history. That is to say, for most artists, the present seemed to be unfolding with an inevitable, forward motion which also seemed allegorical: we read the texture of daily life for signs of a deeper structure of change, and the imminent decline of apartheid.

In those years of national allegory, the cultures of the mass democratic movement—of the United Democratic Front, COSATU, the Congress of South African Writers and a thousand other organizations—provided opportunities for artists to call themselves “cultural workers” and be at the forefront of political struggle. Similarly, community arts organizations were by today's standards quite well endowed and active, because they were also covert conduits for funding channeled to other political groups. With the democratic revolution of 1994, much of the entailed foreign funding dried up. However, in the climate of reconstruction that followed, some of the older stereotypes of art and direct action survived into the new arts funding models, while the visibility of artists as public intellectuals active in the making of culture and citizenship declined sharply.

Into the Rainbow

When Desmond Tutu coined the phrase “rainbow people of God” for the citizens of the new South Africa, he put a polychromatic spin on an idea that was already circulating in the discourses of arts funding in the new nation. The dual mandate of reconciliation and redress was the cornerstone of the first major post-apartheid arts policy document, the 1996 *White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage*. As though following the rhetoric of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the White Paper suggested that “arts and culture may play a leading role through promoting reconciliation,” and it underscored the “potential of arts and culture in a period of national regeneration and restoration”.

The *White Paper* also advanced an historical analysis of the fate of cultures under colonialism. The unremitting violence of colonialism and apartheid, it claims, meant that “indigenous forms began to collapse under the demands of mining and agriculture” (7). The consequence for arts policy, is that indigenous culture is represented as a kind of repressed, pre-colonial potential: “Our art forms, oratory, praise poetry, storytelling, dance and rituals live on in the collective memory. They are waiting in the wings to be reclaimed and proclaimed as part of the heritage of us all.”

Not surprisingly, arts funding in the first decade of democracy, was motivated by the same logic of recovery and redistribution as is apparent in the rhetoric of the *White Paper*. That same perspective was advanced in the National Arts Council Act of 1997, which included these two key mandates: “to give the historically disadvantaged such additional help and resources as are required to give them greater access to the arts”; and “to address historical imbalances in the provision of infrastructure for the promotion of the arts”. Most critically, therefore, when the National Arts Council of South Africa came into being in the first generation of democratic governance, it caught the mood of the time, conscious of the need for post-traumatic reconstruction and national reconciliation. In those Rainbow years, moreover, there was also the utopian expectation from the West that South Africa would miraculously solve problems that seemed endemic in Africa elsewhere. “The conventional wisdom has been,” says Neil Lazarus, “that South Africa would be able to solve the problems of development . . . experienced by other African states,” and that it would not “decompose . . . into ethnic chauvinism or class rule” (611). As far as the Arts was concerned, it was hoped that the “Rainbow solution”—which entailed a miraculous political compromise, an alliance government, defence of the rights of eleven official languages, all glued together by the Mandela magic—would bypass the divisions made manifest elsewhere.

But that was not to be. From the outset, the post-apartheid arts were both poignantly celebratory, and a catalyst for new kinds of explosive, ethnic self-identification. Perhaps the best known early example of this was the Pippa Skotnes curated exhibition called *Miscast*, on the face of it a complex and well-intentioned art historical attempt to recover marginalized voices of the early Khoisan peoples. It was reclamation work, of the very sort advocated by the National Arts Council Act. The Bushman (or Khoisan, or San), Skotnes believed, were the pre-colonial nomads crushed by colonialism, and their fragile, complex history could only be evoked by an exhibition which both deconstructed the

colonial museum, and evoked some of its classificatory methods as well as more radical forms of contemporary installation art such as that of Kosuth or Boltanski.¹

As a first, post-apartheid foray into the relationship between arts and ethnicity, this choice of the Bushman was unsurprising. For the South African national imaginary under apartheid, and now it seemed in the post apartheid period, the Bushman represented uncontroversial ethnicity, at such a point of “timeless” historical remove that they could be talked about without raising the spectre of division. Predictably, San rock art was the only ethnically inflected symbolism to be incorporated into the new state coat of arms.

What was significantly underestimated, in the *Miscast* show and in the early forms of arts funding that emphasized the “recovery” of lost cultural expression, was the extent to which such acts themselves constitute newly volatile spheres of performance and identification. The opening of the *Miscast* show was just such an event. It was the occasion for spectacular outpourings of protest and grief, by newly emerging ethnicised groups like the Kleurling Weerstandsbeweging (the Coloured Resistance Movement), and even a group of San from the Kagga Kamma safari park, a group of demobilized Bushman soldiers employed to perform Bushman lifestyle representations for game reserve visitors. The Kagga Kamma group arrived in their ragtag loincloths and skins, part of the tourist costumary that they had been forced to wear.

For some, this attempt, by the Arts, at reclamation and restoration of dignity, seemed to have turned horribly wrong. In truth, though, a specific effort to redress historical imbalances had provided a platform for a very fragile form of collective identity: it helped to mobilize contradictory claims by groups of people Apartheid referred to as Coloured, many of whom continued to vote for the National Party in the Western Cape long after the 1994 transition. “Part of coloured “resistance” to citizenship,” Grant Farred speculates, “may be explained by the fact that in a society with not only a long and antagonistic history of racial division, but a primarily binary one (black versus white), coloured “difference” has long marked this community as idiosyncratically liminal” (197). Once the prospect of refiguring Coloured ancestry, and the Bushman archive, had been raised by the *Miscast* show, it became an explosive context for new performances and new kinds of imaginative claims to citizenship. That this potential appealed even to those marginal and displaced individuals forced to dress in skins and perform debased rituals for tourists, and who now saw themselves being hailed, was prescient of things to come in the next generation of arts practice.

Enter Mbeki

The Act that established South Africa’s first Arts Council mirrors in a significant way the most important first social programmes of the African National Congress in power, most especially the Reconstruction and Development Programme (the RDP). Both were significantly focused on the idea of state-led historical redress through centralized programmes.

Within two years of the first elections, however, there was a significant government policy turn, and the adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution [GEAR] initiative. GEAR is a classic structural adjustment programme, advancing conservative,

¹ See Pippa Skotnes, “The Politics of Bushman Representation,” in Paul Landau and Deborah Kaspin, eds., *Images and Empires* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 253-274.

neo-liberal forms of fiscal policy, and it was willingly adopted, not imposed from without by the World Bank (Macdonald 256). Key features of GEAR included a new notion of the economy being driven by industry competitiveness, and acceptance of the standard International Monetary Fund advice: “higher rates of domestic savings, discouraging government spending, deficit financing, and tax increases; narrowing budget deficits; liberalizing trade; restraining growth in wages” (MacDonald 639).

To understand the changing landscape for arts funding in this period, we have to discuss the paradoxical kind of planning that began to take hold. President Thabo Mbeki has been the most active advocate of the neo-liberal platform. In 1996, we find him making a famously determining declaration, his “I am an African” speech, in which citizenship is conferred on a variety of ethnic groups previously excluded in the post-colonial struggle. It is a ringing, declamatory, yet in some senses really quite clichéd pronouncement: “In my veins courses the blood of the Malay slaves who come from the East. . . . The stripes they bore on their bodies from the lash of the slave master are a reminder embossed on my consciousness” (Statement 8 May 1996). It was with this clarion announcement, three years before he took office as President, that Mbeki announced his great theme: of Africa’s rise from the ashes, its Renaissance.

But where does Thabo Mbeki’s speech come from? Local allusions aside, in its generic references, form, and repetition, its somatic metaphors, this is the 1950s speaking: it is Aime Cesaire, and Senghor, and the Negritude belief in African “rhythm”. How on earth did such a rhetorical lineage come to figure in the post-colonial discourse of the new South Africa.?

It seems to me important to try and understand why President Mbeki invokes these kinds of poetic tropes at a time of such significant policy shift. One reason, of course, is the fact of his life in exile. “Much of Mbeki’s Africanism,” says Mark Gevisser, “has its roots in the turbulent identity politics of the 1960s,” and this was a period when the rhetoric of Pan-Africanism was being interrogated in Europe and certainly at Sussex university, where Mbeki was a student. (Gevisser 220). But there is another, less comfortable explanation. Recent work by the anthropologists John and Jean Comaroff is very salient here. South Africa, the Comaroffs remind us, as the newest addition to the family of post-colonial nations, is subject to contradictions arising from “the effort to make modernist politics in post-modern, neo-liberal times” (632). Moreover, this country’s reimagining of the category of citizen-subject takes place in the global context where the idea of the nation state is more and more abstract. This, they say, is a familiar and destructive contradiction often experienced in the new Europe and elsewhere, and the solution for many of these nations, is to base the idea of national belonging not on citizenship, but on autochthony: identity, that is, defined by the place of birth. Consequently, for these kinds of definitions, the metaphor of blood birth, place, and rootedness, is foundational.

Reliance on the metaphor of rootedness, rather than citizenship, is therefore symptomatic of what the Comaroffs describe as the double bind of the neoliberal capitalist economy: governments are required to deregulate and “open up their frontiers,” on the one hand, and on the other, “to regulate them by establishing enclaved zones of competitive advantage” Locally, this has meant that a significant rise in “phobia about foreigners, above all from elsewhere in Africa, has been the illicit offspring of the fledgling democracy—waxing paradoxically perhaps, alongside appeals to the African

Renaissance and to *ubuntu*” (643). Who would have known, when they made this argument, that within three years South Africa would experience a paroxysm of xenophobic hatred that has seen 70 people killed, and tens of thousands forced into refugee camps.

What we have, in South Africa, is a characteristic pattern evident in many emerging neo-liberal economies: political subjects are seen less and less as citizens, and more as stakeholders, naturally rooted in the country by reason of their ethnicity and birth. However, the failure of present economic policies to address the poor, and employment, and social security, masked by the rhetoric of redress, has produced a pattern of violence that increasingly has ethnic hatred as its pathway. With the complete failure of government policy towards Zimbabwe (based on a nervousness between exiles about criticizing an older generation of male African leaders) and the flood of refugees and economic migrants to South Africa, criminal elements in the poor have taken up the argument around roots and identity and have made a bloody flag of it.

Arts Funding After the Nation State

Given these very introductory remarks, we are in a better position to consider the double bind of arts funding in South Africa today. Arts funding under apartheid was spectacularly inequitable. Whether in funding given to schools, or in the donations that were to prop up Bantustan “culture”, the implication was that blacks were the bearers of culture, rather than its producers. The massive inequality in arts infrastructure that resulted is still visible in the almost complete absence of arts training or facilities in black schools, and the obscene remnants of giant stadia, designed to magnify the voices of puppet dictators in Bantustans at celebrations of heritage and culture, that dot the homeland landscape.

The work of arts funding over the past decade has been to address this inequity. But redistribution of arts funding has been slow, contradictory, and plagued with many problems of delivery. Part of that has to do with the uncertain relationship between funding bodies. The National Arts Council, especially in its new manifestation, is a relatively effective disbursing agency with a complex relationship to its parent body, the Department of Arts and Culture. At the same time, that department suffers from being a kind of orphan unit, with far less political leverage in the urgent task of reconstruction than those ministries focused on housing, health, or mineral and energy affairs, for instance.

Problems in redistributive disbursement are visible elsewhere in the larger system, most dramatically in the National Lottery Trust Distribution Fund. Some two years ago, after a sclerosis in disbursement that led to the collapse of funded projects around the country, the NLTDF was put into a kind of receivership, and it has only recently started making awards again. For DAC, the NAC, and the NLTDF, the redistributive mandate has its origins in the immediate post-election period, and the spirit of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. With few exceptions, they have all run up against the same problems that have bedeviled redress throughout the country: the inability to spend money and monitor compliance, because of the significant absence of trained middle management personnel. So it seems that arts funding generally in South Africa now is experiencing the contradictions of the state as a whole, as it moves away from the

rhetoric of the Rainbow towards confronting the reality of training and infrastructure. As a consequence, it is unlikely that the funding situation will improve without a sustained, national campaign to train and equip arts managers.

But the new NAC is doing quite well by some accounts. It has a clean audit report, and in the 2006-2007 financial year, it disbursed R48 202 957 to individual artists and arts organizations. By far the largest portion of this award, some R20 581 292, went to Music and Opera, while the Provincial distribution was heavily weighted in favour of the most populated areas of Gauteng, Western Cape, and KwaZulu Natal. A second, ominous feature of the funding pattern, is that it was widely distributed, consisting of a thin, equal layer of disbursements, with the majority of individuals receiving less than R30 000 (about \$4000) per project.

We are touching now on the core of a far greater problem of funding and disbursement. At present, and with its present budget, the NAC is simply not a viable disbursement agency. The point can be simply made with reference to the current round of funding. Of the Annual Budget of R72.8 million, 25 per cent is spent on administration, leaving approximately R54.6 million for projects and grants. From that total, three national orchestras are funded, to the value of R11.6 million, a block grant of R3.5 million is given to the Grahamstown festival, and an additional R20 million is allocated to a set number of companies who receive guaranteed grants over a cycle of years.

The bottom line of these figures is that R19.5 million is available for individual, bursary, and small company grant funding over the two cycles of the budgetary year. This money is then crudely, and evenly divided between the various disciplines, giving each panel approximately R1.4 million per session to disburse. The net consequence is that a miniscule percentage of the funds requested by individual artists and companies is available for disbursement in 2008:

**Percentage of Total Requested Funds
Available for Disbursement**

Theatre	8.3%
Dance	38.7%
Craft	8%
Music	11.8%
Literature	38.2
Visual Arts	[figs. not available]

The cost of assembling panels for this kind of inevitable disappointment hardly seems worth it!

There is one last aspect to this sorry state of funding affairs. The tendency of neo-liberal funding environments everywhere, has been to rely increasingly on a system of self-regulating “cost centres”. (Universities, for instance, have had their academic departments redefined as semi-autonomous cost centres.) However, the almost universal tendency of these decentralising bureaucracies has been to divest themselves of costs, which are then charged to the lower administrative ranks. An ever-increasing class of professional bureaucrats at the centre is responsible for monitoring the performance of the satellite centres, which are given costs previously borne by the equivalent of the state.

In the case of the National Arts Council, for instance, the cost of national orchestras, originally borne by the Department of Arts and Culture, has now been made part of the NAC budget, without any concomitant increase in budget. Similar problems in the United Kingdom have resulted in the entire system of panels and peer review being brought into question.

With its first-generation mandate to redress historical disadvantage, the NAC might be said to be fulfilling the letter of the law, but only in a symbolic fashion. Too little is being given to too many, so that there is no long-lasting impact on infrastructure or training or the ability to make new works. It was with this failure in mind that our Research Committee undertook to explore a different kind of funding model, and it embarked on a series of investigative bilateral visits to other Arts Councils, beginning in Stockholm and Birmingham, and continuing in an extended visit to Accra and Kumasi.

One of the first significant insights—thanks to my colleague Kiren Thathia—to come out of these visits is that arts funding in South Africa is suffering because it is not tied to an **audience development programme**. The highly politicized nature of arts practice in the 1990s, with its mass-meeting audiences, masked the lack of emotional investment in the arts by the general populace. To make matters worse, because there has been no sustained attempt to place arts back into black schools, there is now a visible generational divide, whereby black youth distance themselves from attempts on the part of those they see as an older generation, to force “tradition” and culture down their throats. The NAC had to come to grips with this crisis around audiences when several of the new works it sponsored last year at the National festival of Arts were ridiculed as under rehearsed or clichéd, or simply played to empty houses.

Sweden and the United Kingdom have very active audience research and development. Both also have a culture of transparency and debate, which means that funding policy is subject to rigorous critique from below. One of the sadder aspects of the arts landscape in South Africa today, is that the organic intellectuals and cultural activists so involved in the mass democratic movement of the 1990s have faded from view, with one or two exceptions, most notably in the figure of Mike van Graan. Without the reinvigoration of the debate, changes to the funding policy and decisions with regard to disbursement will emanate only from the centre; unless audiences are developed, and a new consciousness and enthusiasm for the arts follows, there will be no rigorous critique of new work. This is not a task the NAC can do alone. It will require substantial collaboration with the Department of Education.

Like most other Arts Councils, the National Arts Council of South Africa employs a system of advisory panels. Unlike in the case of Sweden, however, these are not reference groups. True to the redistributive mandate of the first post-apartheid generation of arts funding, the panels are there to ensure evenhandedness and redress; there is very little extended debate in these panel meetings that is focused back on policy changes. Similarly, there is a lack of critical articulation between provinces and central arts governance. The NAC has provincial representatives and an Executive, but unlike in Singapore, for instance, where regional arts councils have a strong role to play, in South Africa the problem of local government service delivery is repeated in a lack of coordination between the NAC and Provinces. It is theoretically possible, for instance, for Provincial premiers with their own arts budgets to devote little or no attention to innovative emerging artists in their region. We need to take a leaf from the book of other

National Arts Councils who insist that projects must be supported at local level before they receive central funding.

Above all else, we hope that our new funding models will be able to take better account of tensions around race and ethnicity. Arts Council England, for instance, has a systematic programme called the Race Equality Scheme, which attempts to come to terms with institutional racism. We have not thought through these issues in sufficient detail, in part because the problems are being masked by our rhetoric around general redress. In fact, it may be that our present, shallow form of redistributive funding has the potential to trivialize issues of race, ethnicity, and regional difference. Given what I have argued about the new South African economy, and about citizenship, autochthony, and xenophobia, there is the danger that in promoting the “indigenous” in art, we do so at the expense of what is then xenophobically perceived to be “imported”. Handled badly, an unexamined, retributive focus on “indigenous knowledge systems” or artforms perceived to have precolonial roots, would fail to see the always-already hybridized nature of these apparently old forms. Even worse, it could lead to an exaggeratedly patriarchal bias against new urban forms (kwaito and hip-hop, for instance), perceived to be polluting outside influences, whether originating in Kinshasa or Chicago.

African history is littered with instructive instances of failed, state-centred arts programmes that have tried to draw a link between precolonial arts and present practice. Inevitably, these ventures have tended to busy themselves with subsidizing supposedly collective people’s arts such as mural or tapestry, or workshop forms of poetry and playmaking. A classic example of the problem may be found, of course, in the sad history of state arts funding in Senegal, which in the 1980s began to take a very conservative and intolerant approach to art that appeared to deviate from what had by then come to be perceived as a national style. As Issa Samb said about the last years of Senegal’s *Ecole du Dakar*: [It] is the symptom . . . of the contempt . . . for any type of art independent of the state.”

There are nuanced funding models in some countries—and I am thinking here especially of the special funding in Australia earmarked for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Arts—based on the understanding that minority cultures that need to be defended. Even though there has been talk of it, I hope that we would not make the mistake of constituting a separate funding division for Indigenous Arts, unless there were a rigorous national debate about what is implied by such a term. Having said that, our revised funding policy will have to take careful account of growing ethnic intolerance in South Africa. By its very nature, this latest form of violence is constituting new categories of minority culture, replacing old notions of national identity. This is most shockingly apparent in attacks on Venda and Shangaan people, who, by virtue of their history, their association with transborder identity, and their minority languages, are perceived to somehow be foreigners.

In conclusion, I would like to draw together some of the theoretical points raised at the start of this paper, and apply them in an examination of what is certainly, I think, one of the main dangers facing arts funding in Africa generally. The great geographer David Harvey once remarked that the history of capitalism consists of a series of crises “when the landscape shaped in relation to a certain phase of development . . . becomes a barrier to further development” (296). Under these conditions, there is intense spatial reorganization: “the cathedral city,” for example, “becomes a heritage centre”. Under

neo-liberal, globalizing conditions, tourism is one of the main drivers in the remaking and unmaking of space. The new South African economy, like the economies of East Africa, is heavily dependent on attracting tourists and the venture capital that attends them. As more and more international attention focuses on region, place, and marketable difference, this is experienced as pressure by communities who see themselves having to produce themselves as stable, ethnically distinct cultures. One of the greatest challenges for a new South African arts funding model, is to prevent the emphasis on race redress, indigenous knowledge, and lost traditions from contributing to the proliferation across the country of sites for tourist spectacle alone. Here we may indeed be able to draw on the example of Australia, with its very different conception of minority rights. Tony Duke, at this conference has pointed to the ways in which community and regional festivals may avoid the problems of spectacle and marginalization by close attention to the way they are organized: only by grounding the idea of the festival in local decision-making, and training, can the problem of demeaning tourist performance be avoided.

So-called cultural villages are becoming increasingly common on the South African landscape, and many of these receive funding from DAC and the NLTDF. There are also increasing numbers of them standing empty, as the global tourist market turns away from the earlier taste for tribal dancing. But as demeaning as they are, cultural villages are also a nightmarish structural consequence of a system that associates belonging with autochthony, and which replaces mobile citizenship with the spectacle of racial essence. Paradoxically, the counter to this trend may be to evolve a far more differentiated form of funding, one which returns to the ideas of community arts centres, and which chooses and funds to the hilt a series of flagship sites, sites which also function as a nodal points for arts development, and between which new performances and exhibitions circulate.

The challenge of evolving a new funding model for the National Arts Council of South Africa, is that we need to learn from the experience of our African compatriots, and we have to balance the need for redress against the danger of essentialising race, culture, and region, and the further danger of being prejudiced against youth culture. The NAC will continue to recognize the need for redress; however, it will also have to pay closer attention than it has done to the conditions under which the new in Africa is brought into being, and to the agency and rights of citizens making culture.

Professor David Bunn

Addendum: 10 Points About a New South African Arts Funding Model

1. We should beware the rhetoric of redress that associates support for disadvantaged communities only with the idea of broad and shallow funding. Instead, we should consider funding fewer projects to a greater extent and for a longer period of time.
2. The model should support a small number of flagship projects, and flagship community arts centres. In the case of centres, there should be one per province, or one per discipline, and they should be chosen on past track record, and their ability to have a regional impact on arts funding and training.
3. Awards to groups should involve a commitment to funding a circuit of performances, at nodal community centres.
4. Flagship centres should be multipurpose arts support centres, where there is access to help in accounting, project management, business planning, fundraising, and advertising.
5. Instead of focusing on genres and regions, our new model should pay closer attention to the kinds of grants it makes and it should be much more nuanced. It is critical, for instance, that earmarked support be given to new works; to work by established artists; to work by and about youth; to residencies; to internships and critique; and to community partnerships and exchanges.
6. Our grantmaking needs to work actively against xenophobia by stressing the extent to which even the oldest Southern African arts are transnational. In practice, this should involve earmarked funds for joint projects in Africa and on Africa, for visiting artists' grants for Africans, and for forms of collaborative engagement that reveal the positive artistic benefit of intra-African migration of artistic influences.
7. Our entire bursaries funding structure needs to be revised. Perhaps we should no longer fund post-graduate bursaries in the arts, which up to now have been haphazardly awarded. If we continue, a limited number of post-graduate scholarships should be awarded, on the basis of academic merit, of redress, and of the quality of the institution to which application is being made.
8. A better system of bursaries may involve research themes established by the NAC, and an open competition for post-graduate arts management students to focus research proposals on those themes.
9. For an effective revision of the grantmaking process, there must be a radical change in the approach to audiences, audience development, and feedback. Far greater use must be made of online feedback resources and online debates, public meetings, sms voting, and site visits, for instance.
10. There must be a more aggressive engagement with other arms of government, most especially the Department of Arts and Culture, National Lottery, the Provincial Arts Councils, and the Department of Education. The NAC simply has to have more money for disbursement. With the present level of funding, it may not be worth having the NAC as a disbursement agency at all, and it is certainly not worth having panels. It seems obvious that if political rivalries between divisions of government can be put aside, we need to research whether the NAC would be a better vehicle for the disbursement of arts related funding from the Lottery than the NLTDF itself.